Donation protected
Legal fees to protect agriculture.
The United States Court of Appeals, in case number 24-2845, recently ruled that farming is not a fundamental right. This basically means that a state can pass hostile farm-ending legislation, and there is nothing that can be done about it. The farmer is legislatively forced to end his farming operation, lose his farm, and lose his ability to support his family.
It is deer farming that is under attack in this specific case; however, it is very clear that farming in this court decision is NOT a fundamental right, and the state can decide to end it at any time.
The money collected here will be used to further this case and bring it into the U.S. Supreme Court.
United states Court of Appeals Ruling
No. 24-2845
___________________________
Minnesota Deer Farmers Association; Aaron Seitz; Allen Huju; Brian Evans;
Sarah Evans; Deb Houlthaus; John Holthaus; Devon Lien; Emily Lien; Gary
Olson; Jim Simonson; Chase Simonson; Lisa Clark; Ray Matejcek; Michael
Robokoff; Scott Fier; Steven Uchytil; Melissa Uchytil; Andrew C. Whitcomb;
Scott Salonek; Jamey Blome; Renae Blome; Joseph Collins; Ken Williams; Luke
Hanson; Kendra Hanson; Mark Volk; Mary Volk; Nolan Buchner; Stephanie
Buchner; Paul Agre; Samantha Uchytil; Stanley Tvedt; Francella Tvedt; Jennifer
Lynn Boon; Mark Henricus Boon; Trudy Graves; Steve Porter; Peggy Porter;
Nolan Porter; Dennis Udovich
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Sarah Strommen, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources, or her successor; Erica Sawatzke, in her official
capacity as Board President of Minnesota Board of Animal Health, or her
successor; Peggy Anne Hawkins, in her official capacity as Board Vice President
of Minnesota Board of Animal Health, or her successor; Jessica Koppien-Fox, in
her official capacity as Member of Minnesota Board of Animal Health, or her
successor; Alex Stade, in his official capacity as Member of Minnesota Board of
Animal Health, or his successor; Steve Neil, in his official capacity as Member of
Minnesota Board of Animal Health, or his successor; Brandon Schafer, in his
official capacity as Member of Minnesota Board of Animal Health, or his
successor
Defendants - Appellees
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
____________
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Submitted: May 15, 2025
Filed: July 28, 2025
____________
Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
The Minnesota Legislature imposed heightened restrictions on white-tailed
deer farming by amending Minnesota Statute, section 35.155, subdivision 10(c),
subdivision 4, among others. The Minnesota Deer Farmers Association, individual
registered deer farmers, and individuals desiring registrations—collectively, the
Deer Farmers—claim that the amendments violate their substantive due process,
equal protection, and procedural due process rights. The district court1 dismissed
their complaint. The Deer Farmers appeal. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, this court affirms.
I.
Minnesota heavily regulates deer farming. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 35.155.
In 2023, the Minnesota Legislature amended its statutes about farmed Cervidae.
2
See id. The amended subdivision 10(c) prohibits new registrations for white-tailed
deer herds, and limits registrations to only one transfer and to only immediate family
members.3
Minn. Stat. § 35.155, subd. 10(c). By the amendments to subdivision
1
The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.
2
“‘Cervidae’ means animals that are members of the family Cervidae and
includes, but is not limited to, white-tailed deer, mule deer, red deer, elk, moose,
caribou, reindeer, and muntjac.” Minn. Stat. § 35.153, subd. 2.
3
“The board must not allow new registrations under this section for possessing
white-tailed deer. This paragraph does not prohibit a person holding a valid
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4, fencing must prevent “physical contact between farmed Cervidae and freeroaming Cervidae.” 4
Minn. Stat. § 35.155, subd. 4.
Plaintiffs-appellants are the Minnesota Deer Farmers Association and its
members, who fall into four categories:
• registered white-tailed deer farmers with an immediate family
member to whom they could sell or transfer their registration if
interested;
5
• registered white-tailed deer farmers without an immediate family
member to whom they could sell or transfer their registration;
6
registration under this subdivision from selling or transferring the person’s
registration to an immediate family member. A valid registration may be sold or
transferred only once under this paragraph.” Minn. Stat. § 35.155, subd. 10(c).
4
“The Board of Animal Health or commissioner of natural resources may
determine whether the construction and maintenance of fencing is adequate to
prevent physical contact or escape under this subdivision and may compel corrective
action when fencing is determined to be inadequate.” Minn. Stat. § 35.155, subd.
4.
5
Aaron Seitz, Brian and Sarah Evans, Devon and Emily Lien, Jim Simonson,
Chase Simonson, Lisa Clark, Michael Robokoff, Scott Fier, Steven and Melissa
Uchytil, Andrew C. Whitcomb, Scott Salonek, Jamey and Renae Blome, Ken
Williams, Luke and Kendra Hanson, Mark and Mary Volk, Stanley and Francella
Tvedt, Jennifer Lynn and Mark Henricus Boon, Trudy Graves, and Steve and Peggy
Porter.
6
Allen Huju, Deb and John Holthaus, Gary Olson, Chase Simonson, Ray
Matejcek, Joseph Collins, Nolan and Stephanie Buchner, and Paul Agre. Chase
Simonson may fall into two categories. According to the Amended Complaint: “By
Chase Simonson’s own definition of ‘immediate family,’ he could sell or transfer
his white-tailed registration to his dad, Jim Simonson, or possibly to his sister (if she
were interested) as immediate family members, albeit only once. However, at the
present time, Chase has no family of his own, thus, he does not have an immediate
family member of his own to sell or transfer his present registration.” Additionally,
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• unregistered children of registered deer farmers expecting to
receive a registration from their parents;7
• and an unregistered former white-tailed deer farmer desiring a
registration—Dennis Udovich.
The Deer Farmers recognize: “The government’s stated purpose for the state
law’s restriction on alienation of white-tailed deer livestock is to contain Chronic
Wasting Disease (CWD).” According to the Amended Complaint:
CWD is an infectious, degenerative disease of animals that causes brain
cells to die, ultimately leading to the death of the affected animal. . . .
CWD affects mule deer, white-tailed deer, red deer, sika deer, elk,
caribou, and moose. . . . CWD has been found in free-ranging and
captive deer populations in 30 U.S. states and four Canadian provinces.
. . . There is no known “cure” for CWD.
A Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) report to the Minnesota
Legislature identified deer farming as one of the “primary risk factors facilitating the
introduction of CWD into Minnesota—or its spread within the state”; noted
“inconsistent” compliance with regulations; and recommended increased oversight
of deer farms, including addressing “[f]ence deficiencies.”8
The DNR administers and enforces Minnesota’s white-tailed deer statutes,
assuming these responsibilities from the Board of Animal Health. The DNR’s
website says: “Effective Sept. 1, 2024, state law will require that farmed cervidae
Chase’s father, Jim Simonson, could transfer his registration to his son. Because it
does not impact the analysis, this court treats Chase as a registered white-tailed deer
farmer without an immediate family member to whom he could sell or transfer the
registration.
7
Nolan Porter and Samantha Uchytil.
8
https://files.dnr.state.mn.us/aboutdnr/reports/legislative/2022/concurrentauthority-legislative-report-farmed-deer.pdf (last visited July 10, 2025).
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be confined in a manner that prevents ‘physical contact’ between farmed and wild
cervidae.”9
The website provides a “list of examples” that “satisfy new
requirements,” which “are not an exhaustive list for satisfying the statute and are
being offered for illustrative purposes only.” It caveats:
The statements in this document do not have the force and effect of law.
This document is informational only and should not be interpreted as
creating new criteria or requirements beyond what is already
established in the relevant statutes and rules. Whether an individual
facility complies with the relevant statutes and rules will be determined
on a case-by-case basis. Nothing in this document should be considered
legal advice.
The Deer Farmers sued the Board and the Commissioner of the DNR in their
official capacity, seeking a declaration that the amendments are unconstitutional and
an injunction of their enforcement. The Deer Farmers appeal the District Court’s
dismissal of their substantive due process, equal protection, and procedural due
process claims. This court reviews de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Chase v. First Fed. Bank of Kansas City, 932 F.3d 1158,
1160 (8th Cir. 2019).
II.
The Deer Farmers argue that subdivision 10(c) deprives their fundamental
right to pursue their chosen profession of white-tailed deer farming in violation of
their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Court first considers the Deer Farmers’ standing. Meuir v. Greene Cnty.
Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Courts are ‘obliged to examine
standing sua sponte . . . .’”), quoting Adarand Consts., Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103,
109 (2001). “A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press
9
(last visited July 10, 2025).
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and for each form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)
(cleaned up). To have standing, a plaintiff must suffer a concrete harm, not a
hypothetical one. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). “[A]
person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward-looking, injunctive
relief to prevent the harm from occurring, at least so long as the risk of harm is
sufficiently imminent and substantial.” Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
The Deer Farmers seem to assert the substantive due process claim only as
applied to Udovich. As an unregistered former white-tailed deer farmer desiring a
registration, Udovich has standing because his desire to pursue deer farming is “real
and immediate.” McNaught v. Nolen, 76 F.4th 764, 770–71 (8th Cir. 2023)
(rejecting standing for a plaintiff who claimed future harm to her employment
prospects with “little more than an amorphous level of intention to apply for some
vaguely defined positions at some indeterminate point in the future.” (cleaned up)).
Having reached out to the Board about a new registration and learned that they were
prohibited, Udovich took “the acts necessary to make [his] injury happen.” Id. at
771, citing Bernbeck v. Gale, 829 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 2016), quoting Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992). The Association thus also has
standing because one of its members—Udovich—has standing. See Iowa League
of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 869 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The [association] need not
establish that all of its members would have standing to sue individually so long as
it can show that ‘any one of them’ would have standing.”), quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
Recognizing the state’s ability to regulate their industry, see Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955), the Deer Farmers take
issue with the regulation’s “complete prohibition” on white-tailed deer farming, as
applied to Udovich. Trying to elicit strict scrutiny review, the Deer Farmers argue
this “complete prohibition” infringes a fundamental right. But they conflate a
generalized due process right with a fundamental right. “[T]he liberty component
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes some generalized due
process right to choose one’s field of private employment.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526
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U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999). But that right “is nevertheless subject to reasonable
government regulation.” Id. (emphasis added). “The fact that a right is
acknowledged to be a liberty covered by the Due Process Clause does not
automatically render that right ‘fundamental’ such that any statutory regulation of
that right must be subjected to the highest constitutional scrutiny.” Doe v. Rogers,
139 F. Supp. 3d 120, 157 (D.D.C. 2015), discussing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 121–22 (1889) (acknowledging “the right of every citizen of the United States
to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose” without
addressing whether that right is fundamental), Schware v. Board of Bar Exam’rs,
353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (permitting a state to “require high standards of
qualification” if the standards have “a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness
or capacity to practice” the profession), and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997) (listing the few rights the Court has construed as fundamental and
excluding the right to pursue one’s chosen profession). The Due Process Clause
only “specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.’” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (internal citations omitted).
The Deer Farmers present no evidence or precedent establishing, or even
indicating, that white-tailed deer farming is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and
traditions or that the asserted right is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. As
in White Plume, where this court applied Glucksberg and declined to “declare ‘hemp
farming’ a fundamental right,” this court also declines to declare white-tailed deer
farming a fundamental right. United States v. White Plume, 447 F.3d 1067, 1075
(8th Cir. 2006). The Deer Farmers’ reframing of the right as the pursuit of the
occupation of white-tailed deer farming does not change that conclusion. See
Rogers, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 156 (“numerous federal circuit courts have concluded
that the right to engage in a chosen profession is not a fundamental right”). This
court rejects the Deer Farmers’ effort to expand the scope of fundamental rights. See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“We have always been reluctant to expand the concept
of substantive due process . . . .” (cleaned up)).
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Nor does Minnesota’s statutory recognition of Cervidae farming as an
occupation render it a fundamental right. See Minn. Stat. § 17.452, subd. 5
(“Raising farmed Cervidae is agricultural production and an agricultural pursuit.”).
A state statute cannot create a fundamental Constitutional right. See Regents of
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution”). And a state
legislature can rescind or limit a right of its own creation, so long as the elements of
procedural—not substantive—due process are observed. See Van Orden v.
Stringer, 937 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (8th Cir. 2019). See also Gattis v. Gravett, 806
F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1986) (“the legislative process itself provides citizens with
all of the ‘process’ they are ‘due’”).
III.
The Deer Farmers argue that subdivision 10(c) also advantages those with
immediate family members in violation of their equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This court reads the Deer Farmers’ brief as asserting a claim only for
registered deer farmers without immediate family members. See Davis, 554 U.S. at
734 (“A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for
each form of relief that is sought.” (cleaned up)). They have standing because their
inability to transfer their registration at the current moment is a concrete harm, not a
hypothetical one. See TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 423. The Association thus also
has standing because some of its members have standing. See Iowa League of
Cities, 711 F.3d at 869.
The Court “has long held that ‘a classification neither involving fundamental
rights nor proceeding along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose.’” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673,
680 (2012), quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (alteration in
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original). As discussed, there is no fundamental right to pursue the occupation of
white-tailed deer farming. And having immediate family members is a non-suspect
class. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 328–29 (applying rational basis review to a statute
allowing close relatives to participate as parties in guardianship proceedings). Thus,
this court will not apply strict scrutiny.
IV.
The Deer Farmers maintain that subsection 10(c) lacks even a rational basis.
“Where a law neither implicates a fundamental right nor involves a suspect or quasisuspect classification, the law must only be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.” See Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th
Cir. 2012). “Such a law is ‘accorded a strong presumption of validity’ and is upheld
‘if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.’” Id., quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 319, and then FCC v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (internal citations omitted). “The
judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights
nor proceed along suspect lines.” White Plume, 447 F.3d at 1075 (cleaned up).
Minnesota restricted white-tailed deer farming for a legitimate government
interest: “to contain Chronic Wasting Disease.” See Gallagher, 699 F.3d at 1019–
20 (upholding under rational basis review an ordinance with a “health-based
justification”). Subsection 10(c) is rational despite including only white-tailed deer
farmers, not all Cervidae farmers. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979)
(“Even if the classification involved here is to some extent both underinclusive and
overinclusive, and hence the line drawn . . . imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that
in a case like this perfection is by no means required.” (cleaned up)). Likewise, the
one-time transfer provision is rational despite not immediately ending all whitetailed deer farming. See Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486
F.3d 430, 443 (8th Cir. 2007) (permitting legislation banning one type of gambling,
but not all types of gambling, as an “incremental reform”). The Minnesota
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Legislature made a policy decision to allow family deer farms to continue for another
generation, which protects familial, occupational, investment, and reliance interests,
particularly considering the culture of “carrying on of the family farm.” Subdivision
10(c)’s prohibition on new registrations and provision for one-time transfers are
rationally related to Minnesota’s legitimate interests.
V.
The Deer Farmers argue that the DNR implemented subdivision 4’s additional
fencing requirements without any rule-making process, violating procedural due
process protections. The complaint does not adequately allege that a particular
plaintiff-appellant has standing to bring this claim. The Deer Farmers vaguely assert
that “white-tailed deer farmers are being cited for not having the secondary fence.”
(emphasis in original). But their complaint never mentions citations, nor identifies
any individual farmers as having received one. The complaint does not allege that
any individual farmer has an intention to engage in conduct noncompliant with
subdivision 4’s requirements. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.
149, 159 (2014) (“[A] plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he
alleges an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a
constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat
of prosecution thereunder.” (cleaned up)). The absence of standing prevents this
court from reaching the merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998).
* * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed as modified.
Organizer
Dillan Porter
Organizer
Lake Bronson, MN